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Abstract— The utility of Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) 
has gained attention in the field of Digital Forensics in recent 
years. It has been recognized that, along with technical 
examination of digital evidence, it is important to learn as 
much as possible about the individuals behind an offence, the 
victim(s) and the dynamics of a crime. This can assist the 
investigator in producing a more accurate and complete 
reconstruction of the crime, in interpreting associated digital 
evidence, and with the description of investigative findings. 
Despite these potential benefits, the literature shows limited 
use of BEA for the investigation of cases of the possession and 
dissemination of Sexually Exploitative Imagery of Children 
(SEIC). This paper represents a step towards filling this gap. It 
reports on the forensic analysis of 15 SEIC cases involving P2P 
filesharing networks, obtained from the Dubai Police. Results 
confirmed the predicted benefits and indicate that BEA can 
assist digital forensic practitioners and prosecutors. 
Index Terms— Behavioural evidence analysis, reconstruction, 
sexually exploitative imagery of children, digital investigation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Offender profiling is a forensic technique used in 
criminal investigations for analysing, assessing, and 
interpreting the physical evidence, the crime scene, the 
nature of the offence and the way it was committed. This 
aims to create a profile of the demographic and behavioural 
characteristics of an offender against the characteristics of 
those who have previously committed similar crimes [1]. A 
criminal profile may include physical (e.g., gender, age, 
background),  behavioural and psychological attributes (e.g., 
psychological disorders, guilt, anger). Criminal profiling 
offers two separate models for creating a subject profile: 
inductive and deductive. Inductive profiling utilises 
statistical analysis of behavioural and psychological data 
from convicted criminals [2]. It relies on data from criminal 
databases to identify a generalized behavioural pattern and 
personality traits of a typical offender in specific kind of 
cases (e.g., rape, serial homicides) [3]. After identifying a 
behavioural pattern or specific characteristics of a typical 
offender, the investigator can use criminal databases or 
records related to the defined characteristics to develop a 
group of potential suspects [3]. Deductive profiling, on the 
other hand, relates to case-based investigation. It analyses 
evidence from the case in question focusing on specific 
behavioural and personality traits, and uses it to develop a 
profile of the specific characteristics of the probable offender 
[4]. Whichever method is used in criminal profiling, it does 
not necessarily identify a specific offender. However, it 
effectively narrows down the pool of potential suspects and 
enables a more efficient use of investigative resources [5, 6].    
Previous studies have attempted to produce offender 
taxonomies in different cybercriminal domains such as 
hacking, fraud, online SEIC, and insider cases [13-17]. 
Applying both behavioural and technical analysis to digital 
evidence can help investigators reveal information about 
offenders to identify, assess and manage the risk of harm that 
they may pose before they have a chance to engage in violent 
behaviour. In addition to the creation of taxonomies of 
cybercriminals, a number of empirical studies have analysed 
behavioural trends in organizational cyberattacks. These 
studies used inductive approaches [18] and aimed to 
understand the motivations, personal characteristics, modus 
operandi, and the psychological state of organizational cyber 
attackers (e.g., [16, 19]).  
The studies mentioned above have contributed to the 
field of behavioural evidence in digital forensics 
investigations by utilising inductive approaches to produce 
cybercriminal taxonomies. However, their use in this field 
depends on statistics and generalization to create an image of 
the typical perpetrator in specific types of digital crimes. 
This generalized approach, however, is of limited 
investigative use and does not make practical sense given the 
uniqueness and specificity of digital crimes [3]. There is also 
very little research or practice in digital crime investigations 
that incorporates behavioural and motivational analysis, 
particularly for computer-facilitated interpersonal crimes. 
There is even less in the literature that examines the utility of 
BEA in assisting the interpretation of digital evidence in 
these crimes.  
One category of computer-facilitated interpersonal 
crimes that requires more research is the digital possession 
and dissemination of Sexually Exploitative Imagery of 
Children (SEIC) or child pornography. There is a relatively 
small body of empirical research on the behaviour and 
characteristics of online SEIC offenders, with an emerging 
body of literature examining their demographics and 
motivations [20]. The use of technology in the commission 
of SEIC offences also raises significant investigative and 
evidential challenges (e.g., multiple computer users), and the 
theoretical and empirical literature on these criminal 
activities is still in the early stages of development. To date, 
none of the existing digital forensics research that has 
incorporated the strategies and principles of BEA have been 
used to investigate cases of SEIC. Therefore, the main 
contribution of this paper is to examine the utility of BEA in 
investigating criminal cases that involve the possession and 
dissemination of SEIC through P2P networks, and to 
increase understanding of the benefits of BEA for the 
interpretation of digital evidence. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides 
background information on the evolution of criminal 
profiling and BEA. Section III reviews criminal profiling in 
SEIC-related crimes. Sections IV and V describe the 
methodology used in the study and the results obtained, 
respectively. Section VI discusses the results, and finally 
Section VII draws conclusions and identifies areas for future 
work.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In the 1970s, the Behavioural Science Unit of the FBI 
started using behavioural analysis at crime scenes in an 
attempt to construct profiles of offender characteristics [7]. 
Their efforts resulted in the development of the Holmes 
Typology, which used the inductive approach to identify the 
common characteristics of offenders of violent serial 
homicide. The typology depended on the analysis of the 
crime scene to characterize offenders into two groups: 
organized and disorganized [3]. In 1992, David Canter 
developed a scientific psychological model known as 
Investigative Psychology to assist investigations, also relying 
on the inductive approach [8].  Similar to the FBI’s model, 
this approach depended heavily on statistics from offender 
databases [3]. However, he focused on environmental factors 
and used a Circle Theory that classified offenders as 
marauders or commuters. Marauders are described as 
offenders who commit their criminal behaviour in close 
proximity to their home, whereas commuters are offenders 
who commit their criminal activities after travelling a 
distance away from their home [8]. Both the Holmes 
Typology and the Investigative Psychology approach were 
developed based on generalization and statistical analysis 
derived from criminal databases, which make them of 
limited use in real criminal investigations [3]. They were also 
criticized for being culturally biased to some extent and 
cannot be applied worldwide [4]. Further, the Holmes 
Typology lacked empirical testing, while the use of the 
Circle Theory in Investigative Psychology was claimed to be 
ambiguous [3]. In an attempt to overcome some of the 
limitations of the Holmes Typology and Investigative 
Psychology, Turvey [4] developed the Behavioural Evidence 
Analysis Model (BEA). This is based on the deductive 
approach. It uses the forensic evidence in a case to 
understand and reconstruct the behaviour of the criminal. His 
model consisted of four steps: equivocal forensic analysis, 
victimology, crime scene characteristics, and offender 
characteristics [4]. A number of studies have emphasized the 
effective role of BEA in assisting in conventional criminal 
investigations (e.g., homicide, sex offences, rape) [9, 10]. 
Rogers [3] realized that BEA can be of equal effectiveness in 
assisting in the investigation of computer-facilitated crimes. 
To efficiently solve this type of crime, it is important to learn 
as much as possible about the individual behind the offence, 
as well as the victim and the dynamics of the crime [8]. The 
digital investigator needs to employ more than technical 
examination of the digital evidence. For example, in a 
computer-facilitated interpersonal crime, offender behaviour 
can be interpreted from their written or spoken language 
(e.g., emails, documents) [3]. Analysing files on the 
offender’s computer (e.g., Internet history files, recently 
accessed files, time stamps of files, deleted files) can also 
reveal indicators of suspicious activity, as well as signature 
behaviours and psychological characteristics of the offender 
[3]. This helps the investigator to develop leads, and 
determine the location of additional sources of evidence [4]. 
After identifying all the supporting evidence in a case, the 
investigator can create a more solid reconstruction of the 
crime that aids in understanding what happened, and 
provides an explainable basis for expert judgment and 
opinion. 
According to Casey [11], an equivocal forensic analysis 
refers to the process of conducting a scientific assessment of 
the case evidence that includes a thorough examination, 
analysis and evaluation of evidence, where the interpretation 
of the evidence remains open for question. This employs 
critical thinking, reasoning, and logical analysis, as well as a 
consideration of all the possible interpretations of the 
evidence. Victimology refers to the study of victims in 
criminal investigations, and involves a thorough scientific 
study of a victim’s characteristics, daily routines, and 
lifestyle behaviour that may have contributed to their 
selection [12]. Crime scene characteristics refer to the careful 
examination of the unique dimensions of a digital crime 
scene. They provide useful investigative information which 
can answer questions regarding the case, uncover additional 
evidence, and correlate with the offender’s behavioural 
decisions [4]. The final step is analysing offender 
characteristics. Combining the three preceding behavioural 
evidence analysis strategies during a digital crime 
investigation can help determine the probable demographic, 
behavioural and personality characteristics of the offender. 
III. RELATED WORK 
SEIC is a form of offending which involves the 
production, distribution or possession of any visual depiction 
of children and young people engaging in sexually explicit 
activity [21], regardless of whether these materials were 
produced by mechanical or electronic means [22]. The online 
sharing and distribution of SEIC may also involve the digital 
transformation of non-sexual pictures of children into 
pornographic material, the use of computers to digitally 
design and generate virtual SEIC, or the online live 
streaming of sexual abuse of children [23]. 
Although the production and possession of SEIC is not a 
new phenomenon, advances in technology and the 
widespread adoption of the Internet have created more 
opportunities for individuals with deviant sexual tendencies 
to access and disseminate SEIC. The capacity to instantly 
access information, exchange files, and the relative absence 
of effective legal regulation and geographical boundaries 
online have also encouraged this type of offending [24, 25]. 
This has facilitated the proliferation of commercial activities 
related to SEIC, and been a major contributor to increases in 
the amount and quality of SEIC circulating online [25].   
Studies conducted in different parts of the world indicate 
that the online dissemination and possession of SEIC is 
highly prevalent. For example, a study conducted in the 
United States (US) for a period of a year focusing on a Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) filesharing program, Gnutella, found that 
around 250,000 computers in the US were being used to 
share and receive SEIC [26]. A report by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) [27] stated that cybercrimes against 
children have increased around 2000% between 1996 and 
2005. The Internet has largely been credited for this increase 
[26]. A study conducted by BBC News collected data from 
34 police forces in England and Wales, and found a 48% 
increase in the number of online SEIC crimes between 2007 
and 2011 [28]. Statistics from the Dubai Police in the UAE 
indicate that during the years 2010-2014, the Department of 
Electronic Evidence has witnessed a 23% increase in cases 
involving online access and dissemination of SEIC [29]. 
There is a small but developing body of empirical 
research examining the behaviour, demographic and 
psychological characteristics of online SEIC offenders. As 
online SEIC offenders are only now entering the criminal 
justice and treatment systems, greater understanding of their 
psychological characteristics and motivations is required [25] 
[20]. Opportunities to understand this group of offenders 
arise when they are arrested and charged. Studies conducted 
by law enforcement agencies on offenders convicted of 
child-related sexual offences, both online and offline, 
indicate that a large proportion of offenders are well known 
to the children involved, and/or wield significant authority 
over them (e.g., teachers, members of the clergy, close 
family members) [20].  
A study conducted in the US, for a period of 12 months, 
collected data from a sample of law enforcement agencies 
about the characteristics of 2,577 online SEIC offenders. The 
results indicated that the majority of the offenders were of 
Caucasian ethnicity (92%) and over 25 years of age (86%). It 
also found that 11% of the offenders were known to have a 
history of violence, and 10% had a history of offences 
against minors [30]. A UK study of 90 online SEIC 
offenders showed similar results, with 82% of offenders 
being of Caucasian ethnicity. 7% of the sample also had 
convictions for previous sexual offences, 17% for non-sexual 
offences, and 3% for violent offences [31]. Overall, studies 
suggest that apart from the majority being of Caucasian 
ethnicity, online SEIC offenders are a heterogeneous group 
from diverse backgrounds, levels of society, levels of 
education and age groups, with few having a history of 
sexual or non-sexual offences [32-36]. Also, compared to 
offenders who commit physical sexual offences against 
minors, Burke et al. observed that online SEIC offenders 
were generally better educated, employed, in a relationship, 
and had no criminal history [32]. The diversity of online 
SEIC offenders demonstrates that inductive profiling is not 
productive in these cases. 
A number of studies have also examined offender 
motivations for the online collection and dissemination of 
SEIC. Foley [37] and Bourke and Hernandez [38] suggested 
that online SEIC are mostly accessed and collected by child 
sexual offenders and paedophiles. However, other 
researchers found that online SEIC offenders access and 
collect these files to obtain sexual gratification and to meet 
their deviant sexual interests without committing contact 
offences against children [39, 40]. Other studies have also 
identified motivations associated with Internet addiction, 
avoiding negative life experiences, forming social 
relationships with offenders who have similar interests, and 
the satisfaction of collecting a complete series of images [41-
43]. Motivational factors also include the use of SEIC as a 
part of physical sexual offending against children, for 
financial gain, or out of curiosity [24].     
Researchers have also attempted to categorize SEIC 
offenders based on their behavioural and psychological 
characteristics. These factors include offender motivations 
for possessing SEIC, level of technical skills, level of 
involvement in dissemination or possession of SEIC, 
participation in online SEIC communities, use of 
countermeasures to avoid detection, and progression to 
physical sexual abuse [23, 31, 44]. Based on these factors, 
Krone [23] developed a typology to describe SEIC offenders 
that included nine categories:  
1. The browser refers to an individual who initially 
views SEIC accidently and does not communicate 
with online offenders. 
2. The private fantasy offender creates SEIC 
representing their sexual fantasy and has the 
material for their private use.  
3. The trawler is an offender who searches for SEIC 
online as part of wider deviant sexual interests. 
These offenders employ no or few security 
measures to mask their behaviour and do not 
network with other offenders.  
4. The non-secure collector uses websites and chat 
rooms that do not employ security restrictions to 
buy, trade, or download SEIC. 
5. The secure collector obtains SEIC from secured 
communities and online groups.  
6. The online groomer seeks online contact with 
minors with the intention of forming a relationship 
which progresses to online or physical sexual 
contact. 
7. The physical abuser engages in physical sexual 
abuse of minors and uses online SEIC to 
complement or facilitate offending. 
8. Producers are offenders who commit physical 
sexual abuse of minors, and record their conduct, 
creating SEIC files to share with others.  
9. Distributors may not necessarily have any sexual 
interest in children, but are mainly interested in 
monetary gain from disseminating SEIC. 
The behaviours associated with each of these different 
categories of offending generate specific forms of digital 
evidence which can be recovered from computers and other 
devices during investigations. This can be examined using 
BEA in order to build a specific profile of an offender which 
can then be used to determine the nature of their offending 
behaviour, association with others with similar interests and 
risk of progression to physical sexual abuse. This 
information can then assist in criminal investigations and 
prosecution. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The study was conducted at the Department of Electronic 
Evidence, Dubai Police. The data that was used in this study 
were bit-wise images of the contents of the digital media 
devices (e.g., mobile phones, computers, hard disk drives, 
memory cards) that were seized in criminal cases by the 
Dubai Police. The acquired images of these devices can 
contain “evidence” that supports the case, including digital 
files (e.g., documents, pictures, log files, history files, emails, 
contact lists). 
The study used a deductive, case-based, approach that 
analysed individual cases separately and applied the four 
strategies of BEA (equivocal forensics analysis, victimology, 
crimes scene characteristic, and offender characteristics) to 
the examination of each case. It examined digital and 
qualitative information on the application of BEA to cases 
involving the possession and dissemination of SEIC through 
P2P file sharing networks on Windows-based computers. 
A. Cases Selection and Sample Size 
The researcher used criterion-based sampling [26], with 
the relevant selection criteria being the use of P2P as a main 
source to acquire SEIC and the availability of the image files 
of the seized devices. This strategy enabled quality assurance 
and the identification of information-rich cases. Multiple 
sources of data were also obtained to provide saturation and 
confirmation of the emerging results. All of the image files 
of the seized devices were copied for each selected case, as 
well as all of its related documents (e.g., offence 
background, interview scripts, offender information).  
The study sample size was determined by a combination 
of methodological and practical factors. Cases were analysed 
and added to the sample until there was no new identification 
of attributes or variables in relation to the specific 
dimensions of each of the SEIC offences (e.g., no further 
identification of different techniques to evade detection) 
[45]. It also depended on, and was highly constrained by, the 
available resources. As such, 15 cases were selected.  
B. Data Sources 
The primary data sources for this study were the 
electronic data stored on the image files of the seized devices 
for each case (e.g., documents, images, videos, registry keys, 
Internet cache and history files, metadata of files). 
Depending on the case, the image files covered devices that 
ranged from desktop computers and laptops to smart phones 
and memory cards. As the study utilised a deductive 
approach, understanding the context of each case was a 
crucial step prior to analysing the associated evidence. Thus, 
for each case, all available documentation was carefully 
studied before the image files were analysed. 
C. Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection and analysis combined the technical 
skills of digital forensics and the reconstruction skills of 
BEA. The technical skills were required to find sources and 
traces of evidence required in digital investigations. The 
process of analysis of the collected data was circular, 
iterative and progressive. During the examination and 
analysis of some cases the researcher needed to revisit steps 
in light of a more refined understanding of the case. The 
findings of the analysis for each case were summarized, and 
similar patterns were grouped together. Tabulation and 
content analysis were also used where applicable. 
Additionally, a qualitative analysis of relevant case files was 
undertaken (e.g., offender interviews). 
In this type of crime, the digital forensics practitioner 
usually receives the suspect’s digital devices. The 
examination and analysis of the devices attempts to 
reconstruct the suspect’s activities in obtaining and sharing 
SEIC. Therefore, the practitioner aims to answer the 
questions of what, why, where and how the suspect obtained 
these files using the basic principles of BEA defined by 
Turvey [2] in the examination and analysis of the data.  
The first part of the analysis focused on identifying the 
locations of all potential sources of digital evidence in a post-
mortem forensic examination of the seized devices in each 
case. The second part focused on identifying offender 
characteristics, and understanding offending behaviour. 
V. RESULTS 
This section describes the results of the analysis. 
A. Location of Potential Sources of Evidence 
An equivocal forensic analysis of the data, and an 
examination of the virtual crime scene characteristics, 
showed that the main source of evidence in this category of 
crimes was the computer of the offender. In the analysed 
cases, offenders depended mainly on P2P client software for 
the download and sharing of SEIC. In 73% of the cases, 
evidence of deleted SEIC files and/or evidence of uninstalled 
P2P client software and directories was found on the 
offender’s computer(s).  
Offenders used a diverse range of P2P software clients 
(e.g., Shareaza, uTorrent, eDonkey, eMule, ShareStatic, 
eDonkey2000, BitTorrent). However, a thorough 
examination of the virtual crime scenes showed that 
regardless of the kind of P2P client software used, the most 
common storage location of evidence of SEIC offences was 
the Program Files directory and sub-directories. In most of 
these program directories, a shared folder was created where 
the downloaded files were stored and shared by default 
unless the user of the programs had disabled sharing in their 
P2P client. Also, in many of the programs (e.g., Shareaza) an 
‘Incomplete’ folder was created where chunks of the files 
still being downloaded were stored and shared until the 
downloaded was complete. Another location of evidence was 
the library files of the P2P client software. These files stored 
important records of the downloaded files (e.g., location, 
size, filename, thumbnail of the file). In some cases, user 
created files revealed valuable evidence as some had 
changed the default download folder of the P2P program to 
one that they had created. Determining the sharing settings of 
the P2P program was also important in this offence category 
as it potentially demonstrates the offender’s intention to 
distribute the files of interest. In many P2P clients, the 
downloaded files are shared by default unless the user 
disables the sharing option, making an intention not to share 
generally easier to establish than an intention to distribute. 
This was determined either through a review of the registry1, 
or by creating a VMware2 image of the offender’s computer 
hard disk drive. A review of the registry keys also showed 
search terms that users had entered into the P2P client 
software, which could establish criminal intent and 
behaviour. 
In cases where no evidence was visibly available in the 
initial examination of the file system structure of the 
offender’s computer, carving the unallocated space (i.e., 
searching for and extracting files from raw data based on the 
format characteristics and contents of the files) revealed 
artefacts, remnants, or complete files that supported the case.  
These artefacts included evidence that P2P client software 
had been used, SEIC files had been downloaded, or even 
complete “active” SEIC files.   
B. Offender Characteristics and Behaviour 
Using BEA strategies during examination of the sample 
cases aided in identifying offender characteristics and 
understanding associated behaviour. The main findings of 
the analysis are shown in Table I and Table II. Analysis of 
victimology was not undertaken as there was no evidence of 
relations/communications between offenders and victims. 
Also, the physical crime scene could not be directly analysed 
as the sample cases were from the archive. However, related 
details were obtained from the police documentation and 
incorporated into the results. 
As shown in Table I, offenders did not share a common 
demographic profile. They ranged from 24 to 46 years of 
age, and came from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Far 
Eastern and South Asian offenders accounted for the highest 
proportion in this crime category (53%), while Middle 
Eastern were the least represented (13%). All of the 
offenders were employed at the time of arrest. However, they 
varied in occupational status. One offender was a senior 
executive, three had white-collar jobs, one was a student, and 
the rest were blue-collar workers. None of the offenders had 
previous arrests in cases involving the possession and 
dissemination of SEIC. However, one was previously 
arrested in an attempt of physically soliciting a minor, while 
another was arrested for another minor offence. Also, none 
of the offenders had been violent to any extent known to law 
enforcement. Finally, around two thirds of the arrested 
                                                          
1  A database in a Windows Operating System that stores 
information about the hardware, software, configuration settings, 
user profiles, and other important information about the system. 
2 To create a virtual representation of the suspect’s computer to 
visually examine their system in its native operating state.  
offenders (67%) came to the attention of law enforcement 
through online monitoring of P2P files sharing networks, 
while one third (33%) were arrested after complaints from 
individuals outside of law enforcement.  
TABLE I.  CHARACTERISTICS OF SEIC OFFENDERS. 
Offender Characteristics Percentage 
Age range 24 - 46 
Caucasian ethnicity 5/15 (33%) 
Middle East 2/15 (13%) 
Far east and South Asia 8/15 (53%) 
Employed at the time of arrest 15/15 (100%) 
Professional status  
High professional status 1/15 (7%) 
Middle professional status 3/15 (20%) 
Low professional status 10/15 (67%) 
Student 1/15 (7%) 
Came to the attention of law enforcement:  
While online monitoring of P2P Networks 10/15 (67%) 
Via complaints from individuals outside of law 
enforcement 
5/15 (33%) 
Criminal history  
Prior SEIC offence 0/15 (0%) 
Prior contact offence with a minor 1/15 (7%) 
Prior other nonviolent offences 1/15 (7%) 
Prior violent offence 0/15 (0%) 
No prior arrests 13/15 (87%) 
 
Offenders were mainly viewers, downloaders and sharers 
of SEIC. None of them produced or used SEIC for financial 
gain. The SEIC that they possessed were mainly downloaded 
from the Internet through P2P filesharing networks. Two 
thirds of the offenders (67%) also used Web browsers to 
search for and download SEIC. For all of the analysed cases, 
examining the Web browsers’ cache files, Internet history 
files, emails, chat logs, and performing string searches did 
not reveal evidence that the offenders had participated in 
online offender networks or communities. In 87% of the 
cases, the P2P software clients were set to share the contents 
of the share folder, which included SEIC files. In terms of 
the format of the SEIC material, evidence showed that 
offenders were mainly interested in visual files of SEIC, and 
not in written materials.  
Results also indicated that the majority of the offenders 
were not only interested in SEIC. 80% of the offenders had 
between 40-100 images of other paraphilic materials 
including bestiality and fetishism. In terms of the volume of 
SEIC, the majority of offenders (66%) were in possession of 
an estimated amount that ranged between 501-5000 files. 
20% were in possession of between 101-500 files, while 
13% were in possession of over 5000 files. Analysis of the 
directories where SEIC were stored showed that most of the 
offenders (87%) were not concerned with organizing and 
sorting their files. In most of the cases, besides storing SEIC 
files in the P2P share folder, copies of the files were 
scattered in different user-created folders. Only two of the 
offenders (13%) made the effort to sort and categorise their 
SEIC files. 
Assessing the offenders’ anti-forensics skills and 
sophistication in hiding their offending activities indicated 
that 93% attempted to conceal their possession of SEIC 
using very basic methods. 73% had simply deleted their 
SEIC files, and uninstalled the P2P client software. 20% 
attempted to conceal SEIC files by creating a tree of nested 
directories with unsuspicious names and storing the files 
within them. There was no evidence that any of the offenders 
had used wiping tools to conceal traces of SEIC, used private 
or anonymous Web browsing or passwords. Only one 
offender showed a level of technical sophistication by using 
encryption on an entire hard-disk drive. He also had a 
VMware within his other computer, and had set up a server 
of his own. 
TABLE II.  OFFENDING BEHAVIOUR. 
Offender behaviour 
Sample 
Percentage 
Method of obtaining SEIC  
Downloaded through P2P networks 15/15 (100%) 
Shared through P2P networks 13/15 (87%) 
Downloaded through web browsers 10/15 (67%) 
Participated in online communities 0/15 (0%) 
Offender Category  
Viewed SEIC 5/15 (33%) 
Downloaded SEIC 15/15 (100%) 
Shared SEIC 13/15 (87%) 
Produced SEIC 0/15 (0%) 
Traded SEIC 0/15 (0%) 
Format of SEIC materials  
Video files 15/15 (100%) 
Images 15/15 (100%) 
Stories 0/15 (0%) 
Other paraphilic material 12/15 (80%) 
SEIC organised/categorised 2/15 (13%) 
Use of countermeasures to avoid detection  
Used nested directories  3/15 (20%) 
Deleted SEIC files/programs 11/15 (73%) 
Used wiping tools  0/15 (0%) 
Used encryption 1/15 (7%) 
Volume of SEIC  
101-500 files  3/15 (20%) 
501-1000 files  5/15 (33%) 
1001-5000 files  5/15 (33%) 
5000+ files  2/15 (13%) 
 
The interpretive and investigative utility of the digital 
evidence in cases involving the possession and dissemination 
of SEIC through P2P filesharing networks is summarised in 
Table III. This demonstrates the utility of the combined 
analysis of the different types of digital evidence in this 
crime category. 
TABLE III.  A SUMMARY OF THE POTENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND 
INVESTIGATIVE UTILITY OF THE DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN CASES INVOLVING 
THE POSSESSION AND DISSEMINATION OF SEIC THROUGH P2P FILE 
SHARING NETWORKS. 
Digital Evidence Behaviour indicated Investigative utility 
Registry files:  
User profiles 
Password 
protected  
  Determines the 
individuals who had 
access to the machine. 
 If only one user profile 
plus password is 
protected,  it gives a 
stronger indication that 
only the owner can 
access the machine. 
 Connects other possible 
suspects to the 
investigated crime. 
Written online 
communications 
(e.g., emails, chat 
logs, text files) 
 Signature 
behaviours of the 
offender (e.g., 
repeated syntax, 
spelling, or 
grammar mistakes, 
nicknames). 
 Motivation of the 
offender (e.g., 
sexual, financial 
gain). 
 Identify signature 
characteristics of the 
offender. This can help 
identify the offender in 
cases of having multiple 
users of the computer. 
 Can reveal the 
motivation/intentions of 
the offender. 
 Identify links/traces to 
other possible suspects. 
 Can reveal online 
communication with 
offender networks or 
potential victims. 
The location of 
SEIC files: 
In user created 
folders. 
 
 The user had 
intentionally 
downloaded/saved 
the files on their 
computer. 
 The user had 
interest in the files. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession of 
the SEIC files. 
In P2P shared 
folder 
 Shows the interests 
of the user as they 
searched for and 
downloaded these 
files. 
 Shows the user is 
sharing the files 
(either intentionally 
or unintentionally). 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession of 
the SEIC files and/or 
their dissemination. 
Partial files in 
P2P incomplete 
folder 
 The user had 
searched for and is 
downloading the 
SEIC files. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession 
and/or dissemination of 
the SEIC files. 
In Web browser 
cached files, and 
history files. 
Depending on the 
volume of the files, 
and considering other 
factors (e.g., search 
queries, the number of 
times the websites 
have been visited): 
 The user 
intentionally 
searched for and 
viewed SEIC, 
without the 
purposeful act of 
downloading or 
saving them to their 
device; or 
 The user had 
accidentally viewed 
these files. 
Depending on the volume 
of the files, and 
considering other factors 
(e.g., search queries, 
number of times the 
websites have been 
visited): 
 Can provide sufficient 
evidence that the user 
intentionally sought out 
SEIC and exercised 
control over them (by 
viewing them on their 
screen).  
SEIC files links 
in recently 
opened files list. 
 
 The user accessed/ 
viewed the files. 
 The user had 
interest in viewing 
the content of the 
files. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession 
and use of the SEIC 
files. 
SEIC files 
attributes in P2P 
libraries 
 The user had 
intentionally 
downloaded those 
 Provides proof that the 
user had downloaded 
the files. 
files at a certain 
time before. 
 Provides a time frame 
for the downloading of 
the files, which can be 
linked to other evidence 
depending on each case 
(e.g., if the user had 
committed contact 
sexual offence within 
the same time frame). 
SEIC deleted files Depending on factors 
such as time stamps, 
location, and volume 
of the SEIC files: 
 The user 
intentionally 
possessed the files. 
 The user had 
deleted the files to 
evade detection. 
 Can indicate the 
technical skill of the 
suspect in evading 
detection; or 
 May indicate the 
user’s accidental 
viewing (e.g., a user 
had a limited 
number of SEIC 
cached files, all of 
which were deleted 
at once). 
 Destruction of the files 
can indicate the user’s 
intended possession of 
the files (e.g., a certain 
number of cached SEIC 
files existed before but 
have been 
systematically deleted 
over a period of time).  
 Correlating deletion 
dates and times to other 
time stamps can also 
add to the evidentiary 
value of the data. 
SEIC terms in 
P2P search 
queries/ Web 
search engines 
 The user’s interest 
in searching for 
SEIC. 
 The search terms 
used can indicate 
the content that the 
offender intended to 
search for (e.g., use 
of extreme, gross, or 
violent terms). 
 Can indicate the 
gender and age 
preferences of 
victims in the 
images and videos. 
 Provides proof that the 
user at least intended to 
view SEIC.  
 Adds to the quality of 
evidence if the searched 
terms match the content 
of the downloaded files. 
Change in the 
name of the P2P 
download folder 
Change in P2P 
share settings 
 The user is aware of 
the existence of the 
program 
 Can indicate the 
technical skills of 
the user. 
 Can be used to 
determine the technical 
skills of the user. 
The use of anti-
forensics to 
conceal SEIC 
 The user is aware of 
the existence of 
SEIC files. 
 The user’s intention 
to keep the files and 
hide if caught by the 
authorities. 
 The user is 
preventing other 
users from 
identifying the files 
on the machines 
(e.g., family). 
 The user is aware 
that the possession 
of the files is 
wrong/illegal. 
 Indicates the extent 
to which the 
offender is trying to 
 Indicates the technical 
skill of the offender in 
evading detection. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession 
and use of the SEIC 
files, and a strong 
determination to keep 
them. 
evade detection.  
Time stamps of 
the SEIC files 
(e.g., created, 
modified, last 
accessed) 
 Variation in a file’s 
time stamps can 
indicate how the 
user had treated the 
file (e.g., can 
indicate whether the 
user had altered an 
innocent picture 
into a SEIC). 
 Time stamps of the 
files can suggest 
how long the 
offender has been 
collecting and 
downloading SEIC. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession, 
and manipulation of the 
contents of the file. 
 Assists in constructing a 
time frame for the 
length of time the 
offender has been 
obtaining these files. 
Sorting and 
categorizing 
SEIC files 
 Can indicate user 
motivations 
associated with the 
satisfaction of 
completing a series 
of images or in 
sorting the 
collection in a 
certain order; or 
 Having SEIC 
organized for easier 
access and later 
trading with 
interested 
individuals. 
 Provides evidence of 
intentional possession of 
the SEIC files, as well 
as the intention to keep 
the files for later use. 
The presence of 
files containing 
other paraphilic 
materials 
Depending on the 
number of files, and 
where they are stored:  
 Can indicate the 
offender’s existing 
deviant sexual 
interests. 
 Sorting through the 
different types of 
paraphilic material and 
their illegality 
depending on the 
jurisdiction (e.g., 
jurisdictions like the 
UAE prohibits all 
paraphilic material, 
while others like the UK 
does not). 
User’s 
subscription to 
Web sites that 
provided access 
to SEIC 
 Indicates the extent 
to which the user is 
seeking SEIC. 
 Demonstrates the user’s 
affirmative actions to 
obtain SEIC. 
 Can prove intended 
possession of SEIC. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The results of the study indicated that integrating BEA in 
digital investigations can greatly assist the investigator in 
assessing the reliability of digital evidence and the strength 
of associated conclusions. This can produce a more detailed 
reconstruction of evidence that can inform sentencing and 
prosecution in court. It can also assist in mapping and 
understanding offending behaviour and the dynamics of 
offences. For example, the location of SEIC files can 
indicate offender intentions. Some offenders may claim 
accidental viewing of SEIC while surfing the Internet [46]. 
However, digital evidence can contradict this claim if SEIC 
were found to be saved in user created folders. Sorting and 
categorising the files can further indicate offender intentions, 
as well as commitment to their interests through spending 
time and making an effort to classify the files in a particular 
manner. Deliberate attempts to hide SEIC also reflect 
offender awareness of the existence of these files and their 
determination to retain them. It further indicates that they are 
aware of the legal status of the activities and files, and the 
potential for detection and prosecution. Evidence of SEIC 
related queries in P2P client software and Web browser 
search engines reflect the offender interests and intentions in 
finding, viewing, or downloading these files.    
In the interview scripts of one of the examined cases, the 
suspect claimed that he had no idea that the SEIC files 
existed on the computer and, since the computer had 
multiple users, someone else might have downloaded the 
files. Examination of the computer showed, however, that it 
had three password-protected user profiles. The SEIC files, 
however, were stored in nested user-created directories that 
existed under the suspect’s user profile. As such, the 
retrieved evidence contradicted the claims of the suspect and, 
assuming that no one else knew his user password, 
confirmed the suspect’s intended possession of the files. In 
another case, the suspect claimed accidental access to SEIC 
files while surfing the Internet. The interpretation of the 
evidence, however, refuted this claim. First, the amount of 
SEIC files was not consistent with the claim of accidental 
access. Second, evidence showed that the website from 
which the SEIC were viewed has been visited more than 
once over a certain period of time. As such, with the correct 
analysis and behavioural interpretation of evidence, the 
digital investigator can confirm or refute a suspect’s claims, 
assisting greatly in making the appropriate decisions in the 
legal process. 
The study results suggest that it is not possible to 
construct a single profile of SEIC offenders, as this does not 
reflect the dynamic nature of individuals as reflected in the 
basic principles of BEA. However, the identified offender 
characteristics and behaviour was consistent with prior 
inductive studies on the same crime category. For example, 
the majority of SEIC offenders (87%) did not have any 
known previous offences, and (80%) consumed other 
paraphilic materials. This is consistent with previous studies 
[21][47]. Only one of the offenders was previously arrested 
for attempting to commit another minor offence, which was 
similar to the results of the study conducted by Niveau [47].  
The results also indicated that the motivation of the 
majority of the sampled SEIC offenders appeared to be to 
obtain sexual gratification from viewing SEIC. None of the 
offenders were involved in producing or trading SEIC. 
Further, the majority of offenders had a variety of 
indiscriminate deviant sexual interests that included 
bestiality and fetishism. None of the offenders had any 
online communications with like-minded online individuals, 
or attempted to groom minors online. One offender, 
however, might have attempted to progress to contact sexual 
offence with a minor by making him watch SEIC video that 
was stored on his mobile phone.  
As such, from a theoretical perspective, offenders share 
general characteristics such as criminal history and sexual 
interests. However, when it comes to practically 
investigating individual cases, each offender had his own 
way of committing the offence. Therefore, generalization is 
not an effective approach when it comes to the practical part 
of investigating a case. Each offence and offender is unique, 
and must be investigated separately to understand the 
dynamics, actions, and behaviours surrounding the case.  
Digital investigators currently lack a systematic method 
for justifying the digital evidence that aids them at arriving at 
their conclusions. Because of lack of this formalization, 
courts and other decision makers find it extremely hard to 
assess the reliability of digital evidence and the strength of 
the conclusions arrived at by the investigator. The combined 
strategy of applying digital forensics analysis and BEA in the 
current study can contribute to establishing a method for the 
investigator to justify why and how certain digital evidence 
can aid in prosecuting cases of SEIC. The employment of the 
proposed investigative table (Table III) provides 
investigators with guidelines that they can use in 
investigating individual cases within this crime category. It 
also helps less experienced investigators in handling these 
crimes and researchers who may be interested in building 
such profiles further.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Previous studies depended on inductive approaches to 
understand the offending behaviour of criminals arrested in 
SEIC offences. This study, however, followed a deductive 
approach by examining each case separately, applying digital 
forensic analysis and BEA to understand the behavioural 
dynamics of offenders in this crime category. The 
preliminary findings showed that utilizing BEA in computer-
facilitated interpersonal crimes can assist in the investigation 
process in a number of ways. First, it can direct investigators 
to potential sources of digital evidence on the examined 
devices that might otherwise be overlooked. It also assists 
suspect interrogations through understanding specific 
offender characteristics and behaviours. However, the main 
outcome of the study was establishing a method for 
authenticating digital evidence that will aid in prosecuting 
SEIC cases. Table III can assist in establishing the 
significance of the processed digital evidence, and help the 
investigator to form hypotheses about the suspect’s actions. 
This can enable a more detailed reconstruction of evidence 
that can inform sentencing and prosecution. Also, this study 
focused on a specific category of computer-facilitated 
interpersonal crime and was designed to enable it to be 
utilized in investigating individual cases and understanding 
the dynamics and behaviour of individual offenders. The 
interpretation table (Table III) can also be utilised by 
prosecutors to establish a bridge between the behavioural and 
technical aspects of digital evidence. This can by enable 
them to better understand the utility of specific digital 
evidence in supporting the prosecution of SEIC crimes.  
As future work, we intend to perform similar studies for 
other types of computer-facilitated interpersonal crimes (e.g., 
cyberstalking), and design process models specific to each 
one incorporating BEA. The aim is to better equip digital 
forensic practitioners and prosecutors to take advantage of 
behavioural interpretation of evidence. 
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